

## Message Text

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INFO OCT-01 AF-10 EA-11 EUR-25 ADP-00 SS-15 NEA-10 INRE-00

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NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 USIA-12 ACDA-19

AEC-11 AECE-00 SAJ-01 MBFR-03 ARA-11 IO-13 SCI-06

NASA-04 /189 R

DRAFTED BY PM: TRPICKERING/ RES

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APPROVED BY S/ S: DMILLER

EUR - MR. STOESSEL ( SUBSTANCE)

NEA - MR. SISCO ( SUBSTANCE)

EA - MR. GODLEY ( SUBSTANCE)

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 122213

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SUBJECT: AGREEMENT ON PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR

1. THE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL SECRETARY BREZHNEV SIGNED  
AT 12:30 WASHINGTON TIME JUNE 22 AN AGREEMENT ON THE PRE-  
VENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR. THIS CABLE SETS FORTH PURPOSES OF  
THIS AGREEMENT, AN ANALYSIS AND SOME EXPLANATION OF THE  
BACKGROUND OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING  
CABLE WILL PROVIDE TEXT OF THE AGREEMENT ( UNCLASSIFIED).  
THESE MATERIALS MAY FORM THE BASIS FOR POST BRIEFING  
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OF HOST GOVERNMENTS ON THE AGREEMENT, ITS PURPOSE AND  
EFFECT. UNLESS POST PERCEIVE OBJECTIONS THEY ARE AUTHORIZED  
ON AN EARLY BASIS TO BRIEF GOVERNMENTS TO WHICH THEY ARE AC-  
CREDITED ON THE AGREEMENT RELYING ON ABOVE- MENTIONED MA-

TERIAL. USUN IS AUTHORIZED TO BRIEF SECRETARY GENERAL.

2. IN ACCORDANCE WITH REGULAR NATO CONSULTATIONS, AMB. RUMSFELD HAS BRIEFED NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL AND SECRETARY IS BRIEFING NATO AMBASSADORS MORNING JUNE 22. IN ADDITION DEPARTMENT WILL BRIEF JAPANESE, AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND AMBASSADORS JUNE 22.

3. ANALYSIS OF AGREEMENT

THE PURPOSE OF THIS AGREEMENT, THE CONDITIONS FOR ITS REALIZATION, AND THE OBLIGATIONS ASSUMED BY EACH SIDE AND BY BOTH SIDES ARE CLEARLY SET FORTH, PRIMARILY IN THE FIRST THREE ARTICLES.

IN ARTICLE I IT IS STATED THAT AN OBJECTIVE OF AMERICAN POLICY AND AN OBJECTIVE OF SOVIET POLICY IS TO REMOVE THE DANGER OF NUCLEAR WAR AND OF THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

REMOVING THE DANGER OF NUCLEAR WAR IS A CONSISTENT AIM OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY. INDEED, IT IS A GOAL SHARED BY ALL OF MANKIND.

IN THE SECOND HALF OF THIS ARTICLE, THE GENERAL CONDUCT OF BOTH SIDES IS PRESCRIBED TO ACHIEVE THIS OBJECTIVE: TO AVOID SITUATIONS CAPABLE OF A DANGEROUS EXACERBATION OF RELATIONS, TO AVOID MILITARY CONFRONTATION AND TO EXCLUDE THE OUTBREAK OF NUCLEAR WAR BETWEEN THEM, AND BETWEEN EITHER PARTY AND OTHER COUNTRIES.

THIS STATEMENT IS DRAWN DIRECTLY FROM THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF MAY 29, 1972.

THE SECOND ARTICLE SETS FORTH MORE SPECIFICALLY CONDITIONS THAT MUST BE FULFILLED TO REALIZE THE GENERAL  
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OBJECTIVE. THUS, THE OBJECTIVE OF REMOVING THE DANGER OF NUCLEAR WAR IS PREDICATED ON THE ABSTENTION FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE OF ANY KIND BY THE US AND THE USSR AGAINST EACH OTHER, BY EITHER PARTY AGAINST THE ALLIES OF THE OTHER, AND BY EITHER PARTY AGAINST THIRD COUNTRIES.

REFRAINING FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IS A BASIC DOCTRINE OF AMERICAN POLICY AND IS ALSO EMBODIED IN THE UN CHARTER. THE PRINCIPLE CAN BE FOUND IN ALL MAJOR PRO- NOUNCEMENTS IN THE POST- WAR PERIOD, AND SPECIFICALLY IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY AND THE BASIC PRINCIPLES SIGNED IN MOSCOW. IT IS AMONG THE PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN SECURITY BEING NEGOTIATED IN THE EUROPEAN CONFERENCE.

MOREOVER, THERE IS AGREEMENT, IN THE LAST SENTENCE OF ARTICLE II, THAT BOTH THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION WILL BE GUIDED BY THE NON USE OF FORCE IN FORMULATING THEIR FOREIGN POLICIES.

FINALLY, BOTH SIDES PLEDGE IN ARTICLE III TO DEVELOP THEIR RELATIONS WITH THIRD COUNTRIES IN A WAY CONSISTENT WITH THE PURPOSES OF THE AGREEMENT.

IN SUM, THIS IS A BILATERAL AGREEMENT, BUT THE EFFECT OF THE OBLIGATIONS ENTERED INTO ARE MULTILATERAL. THAT IS, THEY EXTEND TO THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE PARTIES AND THIRD COUNTRIES. THE AGREEMENT IS PREDICATED ON THE ABSENCE OF THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE OF ANY KIND.

IT DOES NOT BAN THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE RIGHT OF THE UNITED STATES TO USE SUCH WEAPONS IN SELF DEFENSE IS IMPLICITLY GUARANTEED AND EXPLICITLY PROVIDED FOR IN ARTICLE VI. THE OBLIGATIONS TO OUR ALLIES ARE UNIMPAIRED; INDEED, THEY ARE EXPLICITLY CONFIRMED IN ARTICLE VI.

DETERRENCE, THEREFORE, REMAINS UNAFFECTED. IN FACT, SHOULD FORCE BE USED OR THREATENED AGAINST US OR OUR ALLIES, IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE II, THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE FREED OF ALL OBLIGATIONS IN THIS AGREEMENT.

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THE AGREEMENT ESTABLISHES THAT ANY OBLIGATIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE USE OF FORCE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION ALSO APPLY TO RELATIONS BETWEEN EACH OF US AND ALL OTHER COUNTRIES.

ANY CONSTRAINT THAT THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION HAVE ACCEPTED TOWARD EACH OTHER THEY THEREFORE ACCEPT TOWARD OTHER COUNTRIES AS WELL.

IN ARTICLE IV THE AGREEMENT PROVIDES FOR CONSULTATIONS IN THE EVENT THERE IS A RISK OF NUCLEAR WAR BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION. THESE CONSULTATIONS CANNOT BE KEPT SECRET. BOTH SIDES HAVE THE RIGHT TO INFORM THEIR ALLIES, THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UN, OR THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

IN SUCH CONSULTATIONS WE WOULD, OF COURSE, REMAIN IN THE CLOSEST CONTACT AND CONSULTATION WITH OUR ALLIES.

FINALLY, THE AGREEMENT PROVIDES THAT NO OBLIGATIONS OF THE US, IN TREATIES, AGREEMENTS OR OTHER APPROPRIATE INSTRUMENTS ARE AFFECTED OR IMPAIRED. THIS LAST CLAUSE THUS COVERS OBLIGATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES THAT HAVE

BEEN SET FORTH IN VARIOUS STATE DOCUMENTS, PRESIDENTIAL PRONOUNCEMENTS AND UNDERSTANDINGS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES.

4. WHY HAVE WE CONCLUDED THIS AGREEMENT?

THE EFFORT TO CREATE AN INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM BASED ON THE CONCEPT OF SELF RESTRAINT IN THE PURSUIT OF NATIONAL INTERESTS IS BASIC TO THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THIS ADMINISTRATION. THIS WAS REFLECTED IN THE PRESIDENT'S INAUGURAL STATEMENT CONCERNING AN END TO CONFRONTATION AND AN ERA OF NEGOTIATION.

THIS CONCEPT IS EMBODIED IN THE AGREEMENT ON THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR.

EACH SIDE HAS NOW SET DOWN IN PRECISE FORM ITS WILLINGNESS TO PRACTICE SELF RESTRAINT NOT ONLY IN RELATIONS WITH EACH OTHER BUT WITH ALL OTHER COUNTRIES. BOTH SIDES HAVE CONFIDENTIAL

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NOW STATED THAT AN OBJECTIVE OF THEIR POLICIES IS TO REMOVE THE DANGER OF NUCLEAR WAR. IN OTHER WORDS, IN THEIR GENERAL CONDUCT OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, THEY MUST ACCEPT THE CONSTRAINTS AND IMPLICATIONS THAT IF THEIR ACTIONS OR POLICIES INCREASE THE THREAT OF WAR, THEY WOULD BE INCONSISTENT WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF THIS AGREEMENT. THUS, THERE IS NO CONDOMINIUM HERE, BUT RATHER THE REVERSE. THE TWO STRONGEST NUCLEAR POWERS EXPLICITLY ACCEPT A GENERAL RESPONSIBILITY TO PRESERVE THE PEACE, NOT THROUGH INTERVENTION OR PRESSURES, BUT BY REFRAINING FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE.

THE UNDERLYING SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS DOCUMENT, THEREFORE, IS THAT IT IS A REASSURANCE FOR ALL COUNTRIES.

5. HOW WAS IT NEGOTIATED?

THE CONCEPT OF TAKING SOME FURTHER STEP IN REDUCING THE DANGER OF WAR GREW OUT OF THE DISCUSSION ON THE BASIC PRINCIPLES LAST YEAR. THE PREVENTION OF THE OUTBREAK OF NUCLEAR WAR IS SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED IN THESE PRINCIPLES. MOREOVER, IF YOU READ THE COMMUNIQUE FROM LAST YEAR'S SUMMIT MEETING YOU WILL FIND THAT IT STATES: "THE TWO SIDES GAVE PRIMARY ATTENTION TO THE PROBLEM OF REDUCING THE DANGER OF NUCLEAR WAR." OF COURSE, AT THAT TIME, SALT WAS THE CENTER OF ATTENTION, AND WE ALREADY HAD THE AGREEMENT ON ACCIDENTAL WAR OF SEPTEMBER 1971.

IN THE PERIOD SINCE THE MAY SUMMIT, THE PRESIDENT AND THE GENERAL SECRETARY HAVE HAD EXCHANGES, AND ONE OF THE SUBJECTS WAS WHETHER WE COULD TAKE ANOTHER STEP TO GIVE ADDITIONAL SUBSTANCE TO THE BASIC PRINCIPLES.

THE MAGNITUDE OF THE UNDERTAKING DICTATED A VERY PRUDENT AND DELIBERATE PROCESS, FIRST OF FORMULATING SOME VERY GENERAL PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS AND THEN MOVING TO MORE CONCRETE EXPRESSIONS. IN THE INITIAL PHASES THERE WAS SOME DOUBT THAT WE COULD WORK THIS OUT IN A WAY THAT DID NOT INFRINGE ON THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS OR CREATE A MISLEADING IMPRESSION OF WHAT OUR PURPOSES WERE.

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A FEW WEEKS AGO, IT APPEARED TO BOTH THE PRESIDENT AND THE GENERAL SECRETARY THAT AGREEMENT WAS IN REACH, AND THAT A FINAL DOCUMENT SHOULD BE READY FOR THEIR REVIEW AND DISCUSSION.

6. WHAT DOES IT MEAN FOR THE FUTURE?

OUR ATTITUDE TOWARD THIS DOCUMENT IS MUCH THE SAME AS WE EXPRESSED CONCERNING THE BASIC PRINCIPLES. A PIECE OF PAPER DOES NOT GUARANTEE HOW THE PARTIES WILL ACT. BUT IT DOES REPRESENT A SOLEMN EXPRESSION OF POLICIES AND ASPIRATIONS.

WE BELIEVE THAT THERE IS A WILLINGNESS TO ABIDE BY THE SPIRIT AND LETTER OF THIS AGREEMENT. WE INTEND TO DO SO.

IF THIS AGREEMENT IS IN FACT ACTED ON, THEN THE ENTIRE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM AND WORLD PEACE WILL HAVE MADE AN HISTORIC GAIN. ROGERS

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<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 10 MAY 1999  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** n/a  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 22 JUN 1973  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** collinp0  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
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**Disposition Remarks:**  
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**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** N/A  
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**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
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**Previous Channel Indicators:**  
**Previous Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** collinp0  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 26 SEP 2001  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <26-Sep-2001 by martinml>; APPROVED <25 FEB 2002 by collinp0>  
**Review Markings:**

Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
30 JUN 2005

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** AGREEMENT ON PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR  
**TAGS:** PARM  
**To:** ALL DIPLOMATIC POSTS  
PEKING G  
SALT TWO  
JEC PARIC  
NOUAKCHOTT  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

